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CONFRONTATION ISSUES IN CHILD ABUSE CASES 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Weatherhead Professor of Law 
Case Western Reserve University 
The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him." The confron-
tation clause was held binding upon the states in Pointer 
v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). The U.S. Supreme Court's 
most recent confrontation cases have involved the 
testimony or statements of children in sexual abuse 
prosecutions. 
In addition, Article I, section 10 of the Ohio Constitution 
provides that an accused has a right to "meet the 
witnesses face to face." The Ohio Supreme Court's most 
recent cases a!so have involved the testimony or state-
ments of children in sexual abuse prosecutions. Signifi-
cantly, the Court has indicated that the Ohio Constitution 
provides greater protection than its federal counterpart. 
This article examines these developments. There are 
several related but distinct aspects to the right of confron-
tation. There is (1) the right to be present at trial, (2) the 
right to cross-examine adverse witnesses at trial, and (3) 
the hearsay-confrontation issue, which involves the 
deprivation of the right to cross-examine out-of-court 
declarants. 
THE RIGHT TO BE PRESENT 
At the very least, the right of confrontation guarantees 
an accused the right to be present during trial. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has commented: "One of the most basic 
of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is 
the accused's right to be present in the courtroom at 
every stage of his trial." Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 
(1970). See also In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Lewis v. 
United States, 146 U.S. 370 (1892). 
This right precludes a trial in absentia unless the 
defendant forfeits the right to be present at trial by ob-
streperous conduct, Illinois v. Allen, supra, or by failing to 
attend the trial after its commencement. Taylor v. United 
States, 414 U.S. 17 (1973). See also Crosby v. United 
States, 113 S. Ct. 748 (1993) (finding that Fed. Crim. R. 
43 precludes a trial in absentia). 
''Face-to-Face'' Confrontation 
The right to be present includes the right to "face-to-
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face" confrontation. The Supreme Court has found a 
Sixth Amendment violation where a screen was used to 
separate the accused and alleged child sexual abuse 
victims during their testimony. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 
(1988). "[T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees the 
defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appear-
ing before the trier of fact." /d. at 1016. This requirement 
is essential to the fairness and integrity of the fact-finding 
process. "It is always more difficult to tell a lie about a 
person 'to his face' than 'behind his back.' In the former 
context, even if the lie is told, it will often be told less 
convincinqlv:" /d. at 1019. In the Court's view, the impor-
tance of this right outweighs its drawbacks: · 
[F]ace-to-face presence may, unfortunately, upset the 
truthful rape victim or abused child; but by the same 
· token it may confound and undo the false accuser, or 
reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult. It is a 
truism that constitutional protections have costs. 
/d. at 1020. 
The Court declined to determine whether an exception 
to face-to-face confrontation could be justified. The 
record in Coy did not support such a finding: "Since 
there have been no individualized findings that these 
particular witnesses needed special protection, the judg-
ment here could not be sustained by any conceivable 
exception." /d. at 1021. 
However, in an important concurring opinion, Justice 
O'Connor noted that the right to face-to-face confronta-
tion is not absolute and the state interest in protecting the 
child could outweigh the defendant's right if case-specific 
findings of necessity are made by the trial court.ld. at 1022. 
The Exception 
Two years later, in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 
(1990), the Court rejected a confrontation challenge 
where a child witness testified outside the courtroom via 
closed circuit television. The Court adopted Justice 
O'Connor's position: 
[l]f the State makes an adequate showing of necessity, 
the state interest in protecting child witnesses from the 
trauma of testifying in a child abuse case is sufficiently 
important to justify the use of a special procedure that 
Telephone (216) 443-7223 
he views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Public Defender. 
:opyright © 1994 Paul Giannelli 
permits a child witness in such cases to testify at trial 
against a defendant in the absence of face-to-face 
confrontation with the defendant. 
The requisite finding of necessity must of course be a 
case-specific on.e: The trial court must hear evidence and 
determine whether use of the one-way closed circuit tele-
vision procedure is necessary to protect the welfare of the 
particular child witness who seeks to testify. /d. at 855. 
See generally Note, "Children as Witnesses After Mary-
land v. Craig," 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1993 (1992) (surveying 
psychological literature). 
Ohio Cases 
The Ohio Supreme Court addressed this issue in State 
v. Eastham, 39 Ohio St.3d 307, 530 N.E.2d 409 (1988), a 
case involving the use of a closed circuit camera to trans-
mit the alleged rape victim's testimony into the courtroom. 
Eastham was decided after Coy but before Craig. The 
Court found a violation of both the federal and state 
constitutions. The Court, however, also noted that a "more 
particularized finding of necessity would first be required 
for this court to employ an exception." /d. at 310. See also 
R.C. 2907.41 (testifying via closed-circuit television). 
In State v. Self, 56 Ohio St.3d 73, 564 N.E.2d 446 
(1990), a 6 year old child abuse victim testified via a 
videotaped deposition pursuant to R.C. 2907.41(A)(2). 
Under this procedure, the victim was subject to cross-
examination, the victim and defendant could see each 
other via closed circuit television, and the defendant 
could communicate with counsel. 
Citing Craig, the Court held that the Ohio statute did 
not violate the 6th Amendment. Similarly, the Court ruled 
that the statutory procedure did not violate the Ohio 
Confrontation Clause, adding that this Clause "provides 
no greater right of confrontation than the Sixth Amend-
ment." /d. at 79. Coy and Eastham, in the Court's view, 
were distinguishable because the trial court in Self 
"made a case-specific finding that the child witness 
would be seriously traumatized by the presence of the 
defendant." /d. at 81. 
RIGHT OF CROSS-EXAMINATION 
The right of confrontation also encompasses the right 
of cross-examination. For example, in Davis v. Alaska, 
415 U.S. 308 (1974), an accused was prohibited from 
cross-examining a prosecution witness concerning the 
witness's status as a juvenile probationer. This curtail-
ment of cross-examination was based on a state statute 
designed to protect the confidentiality of juvenile adjudi-
cations. On review, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed: 
"The State's policy interest in protecting the confidentiali-
ty of a juvenile offender's record cannot require yielding 
of so vital a constitutional right as the effective cross-
examination for bias of an adverse witness." /d. at 320. 
See a/so Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968). 
This aspect of the right of confrontation has not played 
a significant role in the child abuse cases. If the child 
testifies, there is no question that the defense has the 
right to cross-examine the child. 
CONFRONTATION AND HEARSAY 
There are several possible interpretations for defining 
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the relationship between the hearsay rule and the 
Confrontation Clause. 
Since a hearsay declarant is, in effect, a witness, a 
literal application of the Confrontation Clause would 
preclude the prosecution from introducing any hearsay 
evidence notwithstanding the applicability of a long-
recognized hearsay exception. The U.S. Supreme Court 
has never accepted this interpretation because it "would 
abrogate virtually every hearsay exception, a result long 
rejected as unintended and too extreme." Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,63 (1980). 
The Confrontation Clause also could be interpreted as 
requiring only the right to cross-examine in-court 
witnesses and not out-of-court declarants. Under this 
view, all hearsay exceptions would satisfy constitutional 
requirements. The Supreme Court also has rejected this 
view. Although the Court has recognized that the Con-
frontation Clause and the hearsay rule "stem from the 
same roots,'1 it "has never equated the two." Dutton v. 
Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970). In another case the Court 
stated it this way: 
While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules 
and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed 
to protect similar values, it is quite a different thing to 
suggest that the overlap is complete and that the 
Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less than a 
codification of the rules of hearsay and their excep-
tions as they existed historically at common iaw. Our 
decisions have never established such a congruence; 
indeed, we have more than once found a violation of 
confrontation values even though the statements in 
issue were admitted under an arguably recognized 
hearsay exception ... The converse is equally true: 
merely because evidence is admitted in violation of a 
long-established hearsay rule does not lead to the auto-
matic conclusion that confrontation rights have been 
denied. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970). 
The Court recently reaffirmed this view: "We have been 
careful 'not to equate the Confrontation Clause's prohibi-
tions with the general rule prohibiting the admission of 
hearsay statements.'" White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 741 
(1992) (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814 (1990)). 
Instead of either of the approaches discussed above, 
the Court has attempted to steer a middle course, a task 
that often has proved elusive. As McCormick's treatise 
notes: "A discussion of constitutional limitations upon the 
use of hearsay might well commence with the observa-
tion that their outline is somewhat less than clear." 
McCormick, Evidence§ 252, at 749 (3d ed. 1984). 
OHIO v. ROBERTS 
The Court's current confrontation jurisprudence in this 
area can perhaps be best understood by examining Ohio 
v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), and its progeny. 
In Roberts the Court identified two values underlying 
the Confrontation Clause: the "Framers' preference for 
face-to-face accusation" and an "underlying purpose to 
augment accuracy in the factfinding process.'' /d. at 65. 
From these values, the Court derived a two-pronged 
analysis that focused on (1) the unavailability of the 
declarant and (2) the reliability of the hearsay statement. 
The Court wrote: 
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for 
cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause 
normally requires a showing that [the declarant] is 
unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible 
only if it bears adequate "indicia of reliability." Reliabil-
ity can be inferred without more in a case where the 
evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. 
In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least 
absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trust-
worthiness. /d. at 66. 
This summation of confrontation requirements immedi-
ately raised problems. What is a "firmly rooted" hearsay 
exception? Most of the hearsay exceptions in the Federal 
Rules of Evidence reflect well-established exceptions. 
Some, however, rest on rather shaky grounds. Are they 
all "firmly rooted';? Moreover, does the widespread adop-
tion of the Federal Rules by the states (now 36) demon-
strate that the innovative exceptions are now "firmly 
rooted" exceptions? 
The Roberts' decision, however, also raised a far moie 
significant issue. Although both the unavailability and 
reliability requirements were independently recognized 
in the Court's prior confrontation cases, the combination 
of the two in Roberts was problematic. Roberts involved 
the admissibility of a preliminary hearing transcript as 
former testimony, a hearsay exception that traditionally 
required a showing of unavailability. Most hearsay excep-
tions, however, do not require a demonstration of unavail-
ability. Did the Court intend to impose an unavailability 
requirement in every case? 
This aspect of the opinion could have significant 
repercussions. As one commentator noted: "Beneath 
[Roberts1 apparently orthodox disposition ... lies an 
interpretation of possibly far-reaching significance:' Lilly, 
"Notes on the Confrontation Clause and Ohio v. Roberts," 
36 U. Fla. L. Rev. 207, 224 (1984). Another writer pointed 
out that the Roberts' "framework was immediately 
controversial." Jonakait, "Restoring the Confrontation 
Clause to the Sixth Amendment," 35 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 
557, 558 (1988). 
THE UNAVAILABILITY REQUIREMENT 
United States v. lnadi 
Roberts' two-prong approach, requiring both reliability 
and unavailability, was soon modified. In United States v. 
lnadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986), the trial court admitted tapes 
as coconspirator admissions under Federal Evidence 
Rule 801(d)(2)(E). The defendant objected on confronta-
tion grounds, arguing that the prosecution had failed to 
establish the unavailability of the declarant as required 
by Roberts. 
Despite the broad language on unavailability in 
Roberts, the /nadi Court limited Roberts to former 
testimony cases. The Court declared: 
Roberts should not be read as an abstract answer to 
questions not presented in that case, but rather as a 
resolution of the issue the Court said it was examining: 
"the constitutional propriety of the introduction in 
evidence of the preliminary hearing testimony of a 
witness not produced at the defendant's subsequent 
state criminal trial." /d. at 392-93 (quoting Roberts, 448 
U.S. at 58). 
Later in the opinion, the Court returned to this point, 
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writing that Roberts does not "stand for the radical propo-
sition that no out-of-court statement can be introduced by 
the government without a showing that the declarant is 
unavailable." /d. at 394. 
White v. Illinois 
In 1992, the Court reaffirmed this position in White v. 
Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992), a child sexual abuse prose-
cution, in which the child's hearsay statements were 
admitted in evidence under two hearsay exceptions: 
excited utterances and statements made for the purpose 
of medical treatment. The statements had been made to 
the child's mother and babysitter, as well as to a doctor, 
nurse, and police officer. The child did not testify and 
thus the principal issue was whether the prosecution had 
to establish the unavailability of the child as a prerequi-
site to admitting the statements under these exceptions. 
The Court, once again, held that the unavailability 
requirement set forth in Roberts was limited to the former 
testimony exception to the hearsay rule: "Roberts stands 
for the proposition that unavailability analysis is a neces-
sary part of the Confrontation Clause inquiry only when 
the challenged out-of-court statements were made in 
the course of a prior judicial proceeding." /d. at 741 
(emphasis added). 
These two cases establish blanket rules dispensing 
with the unavailability requirement for at least some 
hearsay exceptions- the coconspirator exception in 
lnadi and the excited utterance and medical diagnosis 
exceptions in White. The Court offered two rationales for 
these rulings. 
"Better Evidence" Argument 
First, the Court reasoned that the coconspirator, excit-
ed utterance, and medical diagnosis exceptions differ 
from the former testimony exception at issue in Roberts. 
Unlike former in-court testimony, coconspirator state-
ments "provide evidence of the conspiracy's context that 
cannot be replicated, even if the declarant testifies to the 
same matters in court." /nadi, 475 U.S. at 395. 
Similarly, the White Court noted that excited utterances 
and statements made for the purpose of medical diagno-
sis had substantial probative value that "could not be 
duplicated simply by the declarant later testifying in 
court." White, 112 S. Ct. at 743. 
In short, the Court believed that the out-of-court state-
ment is "better evidence" than the in-court testimony. 
"When two versions of the same evidence are available, 
longstanding principles of the law of hearsay, applicable 
as well to Confrontation Clause analysis, favor the better 
evidence." lnadi, 475 U.S. at 394. 
This argument is flawed because it presupposes that 
either the out-of-court statement or the in-court testimony 
may be introduced at trial. There is no reason, however, 
why both cannot be admitted in evidence in most trials. 
Under the hearsay rule, statements falling within these 
exceptions are admissible even if the declarant testifies. 
''Burden-Benefit'' Argument 
The second reason noted in these cases involved what 
the Court believed to be an unnecessary burden on the 
prosecution. The prosecution subpoenas those witness-
es that it needs, and the defense is guaranteed the same 
opportunity under the Compulsory Process Clause. An 
unavailability rule would operate only in those cases 
where neither side wanted to call the witness. In the 
Court's view, the benefit of an unavailability rule is there-
fore marginal. At the same time, keeping track of addi-
tional witnesses would impose "substantial burdens" 
because the "prosecution would be required to repeated-
ly locate and keep continuously available each declarant." 
White, 112 S. Ct. at 742. 
Once, again, the Court's opinions are not persuasive. 
The prosecution has to keep track of the state's witness-
es. Typically, this means retaining their name, address, 
telephone number, and place of employment, and issuing 
subpoenas when necessary. The incremental burden of 
keeping track of additional witnesses would often be 
minimal. The declarant in lnadi failed to appear due to 
car trouble, a rather unimpressive excuse. 
THE RELIABILITY REQUIREMENT 
Subsequent decisions also considered the reliability 
prong specified in Roberts. Under this prong, a hearsay 
statement satisfies confrontation requirements if the 
statement (1) falls within a "firmly rooted" hearsay excep-
tion or (2) possesses "particularized guarantees of trust-
worthiness." 
Bourjaily v. United States 
The Court's first post-Roberts case on this issue was 
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987). Like Jnadi, 
it involved coconspirator statements. Jnadi, however, 
addressed only the unavailability issue. Bourjaily exam-
ined the reliability issue. Tracing the judicial history of the 
coconspirator exception back over a century and a half, 
the Court found the exception "firmly enough rooted in 
our jurisprudence." /d. at 183. Accordingly, in the Court's 
view, such statements automatically satisfy confrontation 
demands for reliability. Longevity, by itself, seems to be 
the talisman for determining whether an exception is 
"firmly rooted." 
Surprisingly, the Court failed to examine the underly-
ing rationale for the exception, a rationale that "is not 
altogether easy to grasp." Johnson, "The Unnecessary 
Crime of Conspiracy," 61 Calif. L. Rev. 1137, 1183 (1973). 
Unlike other exceptions, coconspirator statements are 
not "regarded as carrying some particular guarantee of 
trustworthiness." /d. at 1184. The federal drafters explicit-
ly stated that admissions, such as coconspirator state-
ments, are not based on a reliability rationale: "No 
guarantee of trustworthiness is required in the case of an 
admission." Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) advisory committee's 
note. See also Davenport, "The Confrontation Clause 
and the Coconspirator Exception in Criminal Prosecu-
tions: A Functional Analysis," 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1378, 1384 
(1972) ("[T]he coconspirator exception has usually been 
supported by a variety of theories unrelated to the trust-
worthiness of the evidence itself."). 
Rather, the coconspirator exception is often justified on 
agency principles- a "partners in crime" rationale. The 
federal drafters recognized that the "agency theory of 
conspiracy is at best a fiction." Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) 
advisory committee's note. The drafters nevertheless 
failed to supply an alternative rationale. Professor 
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Mueller observes: "In terms of theory, [the rule] is an 
embarrassment ... [l]t seems to have been created by 
accident, and the one traditional explanation which 
survives does not convince." Mueller, "The Federal 
Coconspirator Exception: Action, Assertion, and Hear-
say," 12 Hofstra L. Rev. 323, 324 (1984). Some commen-
tators candidly admit that the principal justification for the 
exception is "necessity" and not reliability. See Levie, 
"Hearsay and Conspiracy: A Reexamination of the 
CoConspirators' Exception to the Hearsay Rule," 52 
Mich. L. Rev. 1159, 1166 (1954) ("Conspiracy is a hard 
thing to prove .... Conspirators declarations are admit-
ted out of necessity."). 
Coconspirator statements sometimes are against the 
penal interest of the declarant. But nothing in the cocon-
spirator rule requires that the statement be against 
interest when made: "the authorities agree that admis-
sions of the agent ... are admissible whether or not he 
thought the statements to be against his or his principal's 
interest at the time he made them." Johnson, supra, at 
1184. Federal Rule 804(b)(3) now recognizes an excep-
tion for statements against penal interest, and thus there 
is no need for a separate coconspirator exception if the 
"against interest" notion is the underlying rationale. This 
exception, however, is more demanding than the cocon-
spirator exception because it requires the unavailability 
of the declarant. 
The Court's casual treatment of the reliability issue in 
Bourjai/y belies its stated concern for trustworthiness. 
White v. Illinois 
The Court adopted the same analysis in White, writing 
that there "can be no doubt" that the excited utterance 
and medical diagnosis exceptions are "firmly rooted." 
The Court noted that the excited utterance exception has 
been recognized for "at least two centuries" and that the 
Federal Rules of Evidence and nearly "four-fifths" of the 
states have adopted it. White, 112 S. Ct. at 742 n. 8. 
Here, again, the Court overlooked the long-standing 
criticism of the excited utterance exception. As early as 
1928, commentators discussed the effect of stress on 
perception. Hutchins & Slesinger, "Spontaneous Excla-
mations," 28 Colum. L. Rev. 432, 439 (1928) ("What the 
emotion gains by way of overcoming the desire to lie, it 
loses by impairing the declarant's power of observa-
tion"). The latest edition of McCormick's text contains the 
following evaluation: 
The entire basis for the exception is, of course, subject 
to question. While psychologists would probably 
concede that excitement minimizes the possibility of 
reflective self-interest influencing the declarant's state-
ments, they have questioned whether this might be 
outweighed by the distorting effect of shock and excite-
ment upon the declarant's observation and judgment." 
2 McCormick on Evidence 216 (4th ed. 1992). 
See also Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony 33 (1979) (discuss-
ing the effect of stress on perception); Stewart, "Percep-
tion, Memory, and Hearsay: A Criticism of Present Law 
and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence," 1970 Utah 
L. Rev. 1, 27. 
The Court's treatment of the medical diagnosis excep-
tion is also flawed. As one commentator notes, this 
exception "is not a centuries' old exception, since it Was 
firmly adopted only eighteen years ago in the Federal 
Rules of Evidence. The [White] opinion does not mention 
this." Swift, "Smoke and Mirrors: The Failure of the 
Supreme Court's Accuracy Rationale in White v. Illinois 
Requires a New Look at Confrontation," 22 Cap. L. Rev. 
145, 155 (1993). Moreover, the Court's broad definition of 
the exception "would seem to include anything the . 
patient chooses to talk about with a doctor!" /d. at 157. 
Particularized Guarantees of Trustworthiness 
According to Roberts, a statement that does not fall 
within a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception satisfies 
Confrontation Clause demands if it possesses particula-
rized guarantees of trustworthiness. The Court 
addressed this issue in a case involving the admissibility 
of a child's statement under a residual hearsay excep-
tion. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990). The Idaho 
residual exception is patterned after the federal rule, an 
exception that was not adopted in Ohio. 
This trustworthiness requirement involves a case-by-
case approach that considers the "totality of the circum-
stances" at the time the statement was made. These 
factors include spontaneity, consistency of repetition, the 
mental state of the declarant, use of terminology unex-
pected of a child of similar age, and lack of motivation to 
lie. /d. at 806. 
The Court ruled that after-the-fact corroboration cannot 
be considered: "[T]he relevant circumstances include 
only those that surround the making of the statement and 
that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief." /d. 
at 819. In rejecting reliance on corroborating proof, the 
Court wrote: 
[T]he use of corroborating evidence to support a hear-
say statement's "particularized guarantees of trustwor-
thiness' would permit admission of a presumptively 
unreliable statement by bootstrapping on the trustwor-
thiness of other evidence at trial, a result we think at 
odds with the requirement that hearsay evidence 
admitted under the Confrontation Clause be so trust-
worthy that cross-examination of the declarant would 
be of marginal utility. /d. at 823. 
fhe Court did not extensively discuss Wright in White v. 
'1/inois. The Court's dichotomy between "firmly rooted" 
3xceptions, which are presumptively reliable, and those 
3Xceptions that are not "firmly rooted," which require a 
Jarticularized reliability analysis, seems questionable 
IVhen the facts of the two cases are examined: 
Ironically, the very statement that Was excluded in 
Wright as violating the Confrontation Clause because it 
did not demonstrate particularized indicia of reliability 
was given by a two-and-one-half-year-old child to a 
doctor. One wonders why the four-year-old child's 
statement to the doctor and nurse in White should be 
subject to different Confrontation Clause analysis than 
the child's statements to the doctor in Wright. The 
fortuity that the same type of statements were admitted 
under different hearsay exceptions now appears to 
govern the type of constitutional analysis ultimately 
applied to such hearsay. Raeder, "White's Effect on the 
Right to Confront One's Accuser," ABA Grim. Justice, 
Winter 1993, No.4, at 2, 7. 
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FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Despite the U.S. Supreme Court's statements in earlier 
cases, the most recent decisions suggest that the right of 
confrontation has been "deconstitutionalized" into the 
hearsay rule. Under the Court's current analysis, "firmly 
rooted" exceptions no matter how flawed are presump-
tively reliable. Moreover, at this time the unavailability 
requirement has been applied only to former testimony. 
Yet, traditional hearsay law always required unavailability 
as a prerequisite for the use of former testimony, and 
thus the Confrontation Clause adds little to the 
safeguards already required by the hearsay rule. 
One commentator has written: "The confrontation 
clause is no longer a constitutional right protecting the 
accused, but essentially a minor adjunct to evidence 
law." Jonakait, supra, at 558. Another notes that the 
Supreme Court "has transformed a constitutional guar-
antee into an evidentiary doctrine 'generally designed to 
protect similar values,' as the hearsay rule." Berger, "The 
Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A 
Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model,'' 76 Minn. 
L. Rev. 557, 557 (1992). See also Haddad, 'The Future of 
Confrontation Clause Developments: What Will Emerge 
When the Supreme Court Synthesizes the Diverse Lines 
of Confrontation Decisions?," 81 J. Grim. L. & Criminolo-
gy 77, 80 (1990) ("Because of these rules, the confronta-
tion clause offers little protection beyond that afforded by 
domestic hearsay iaw."). 
Nevertheless, the Court has not formally adopted this 
position, and challenges to hearsay statements should 
continue to be made on both federal and state constitu-
tional grounds. The Court has granted certiorari in a case 
involving the declaration against penal interest exception 
to the hearsay rule, Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). Williamson v. 
United States, 114 S. Ct. 681 (1993). This will afford the 
Court an another opportunity to resolve some of these 
problems. 
The Court has also failed to explain what appears to be 
an inconsistency between the two lines of confrontation 
cases discussed above: the face-to-face confrontation 
cases (Coy and Craig) and the hearsay cases (White). 
One writer put it this way: 
[l]f a child is called to testify, no precautions such as 
screens or televised testimony are allowed without a 
showing of necessity. [Coy and Craig] Yet prosecutors 
can refuse to call a child at all, offering no justification, 
and obtain a valid conviction based solely on repetition 
of the child's statements which meet the criteria for 
firmly rooted hearsay exceptions. [White] Doubtless, 
most defense counsel would rather cross-examine a 
child who is hidden behind a screen or located in a 
different room than have no opportunity at all for cross-
examination. Raeder, supra, at 4. 
OHIO CASES 
The Ohio cases involving hearsay problems in child 
abuse prosecutions first arose in cases interpreting the 
excited utterance exception, Ohio R. Evid. 803(2). These 
cases carved out an expansive exception in abuse cases. 
See State v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St. 87, 524 N.E.2d 466 
(1988) (statement made 15 hours after incident admitted). 
Recently, the Ohio Supreme Court acknowledged this 
development. In State v. Taylor, 66 Ohio St.3d 295, 612 
N.E.2d 316 (1993), the Court wrote: 
There is no per se amount of time after which a state-
ment can no longer be considered to be an excited 
utterance. The central requirements are that the state-
ment must be made while the declarant is still under 
the stress of the event and the statement may not be a 
result of reflective thought. 
Therefore the passage of time between the state-
ment and the event is relevant but not dispositive of the 
question. 
Merely being "upset" clearly does not meet the 
standard for admissibility under Evid. R. 803(2) because 
it does not show that [the declarant's] statements were 
not the result of reflective thought. /d. at 303. 
The Court went on to distinguish cases in which an excit-
ed utterance is made by a sexually abused child. Accord-
ing to the Court: 
In the cases of statements made by children who say 
they were sexually assaulted, we have upheld the 
admission of those statements even when made after 
a substantial lapse of time, but in those cases we have 
done so because we recognize that children are likely 
to remain in a state of nervous excitement longer than 
would an adult ... 
This trend of liberalizing the requirements for an 
excited utterance when applied to young children who 
a;e the victims of sexual assault is also based on the 
recognition of their limited reflective powers. Inability to 
fully reflect makes it likely that the statements are trust-
worthy. /d. at 304. 
STATE v. BOSTON 
In State v. Boston, 46 Ohio St.3d 108, 545 N.E.2d 1220 
(1989), a child sexual abuse case, the Supreme Court 
considered the hearsay exception for statements made 
for the purpose of medical diagnosis, Rule 803(4). The 
Court identified a number of problematic aspects when 
this exception is used in child abuse cases. 
The first problem relates to the "motivational" rationale. 
The underlying rationale of Rule 803(4) turns on the 
motivation of the declarant- a person seeking medical 
treatment would tell the truth. Boston questioned 
whether this motivational factor applied to a young child: 
"[S)uch a young child is not giving the doctor the infor-
mation for the purposes required by Evid. R. 803(4). 
More than likely, the child does not even want to be 
seeing the doctor!" /d. at 122. 
A second problem concerns whether the statement 
must be made to a physician. Statements made to "a 
psychologist, counselor, social worker, minister, etc." 
pose a dilemma. 
A third problem concerns the identification of the 
perpetrator in the out-of-court statement. Is such an iden-
tification pertinent to medical diagnosis or treatment? 
The Court went on to create, under its inherent authori-
ty, its own hearsay exception for child abuse cases. The 
Court concluded: 
[A]n out-of-court statement of an allegedly abused 
child of tender years, including identification of a 
perpetrator, made to a qualified expert in child abuse, 
is admissible if the expert has independent evidence 
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of physical or emotional abuse of the child, the child 
has no apparent motive for fabricating the statement 
and the child has been found unavailable after a good-
faith effort to produce the child in court. /d. at 127. 
STATE v. DEVER 
In State v. Dever, 64 Ohio St.3d 401, 596 N.E.2d 436 
(1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1279 (1993), the Supreme 
Court once again examined the medical diagnosis 
exception, ruling that a statement made by a 4-year old 
child to a pediatrician concerning sex abuse was admis-
sible under Ohio Rule 803(4). In so holding, the Court 
overruled Boston in part. As noted above, Boston ques-
tioned whether the motivational factor applied to a young 
child. The Court in Dever found the Boston analysis too 
"rigid." The Court wrote: 
Once the child is at the doctor's office, the probabili-
ty of understanding the significance of the visit is 
heightened and the motivation for diagnosis and treat-
ment will normally be present. That is to say, the initial 
desire to seek treatment may be absent, but the moti-
vation can certainly arise once the child has been 
taken to the doctor. Absent extraordinary circumstances, 
the child has no more motivation to lie than an adult 
would in similar circumstances. Everyday experience 
tells us most children know that if they do not tell the 
truth to the person treating them, they may get worse 
and not better. 64 Ohio St.3d at 410. 
The Court also noted that Rule 803(4) was supported 
by an additional rationale- that such statements are 
reasonably relied on by the medical profession. In other 
words, the expertise of physicians in evaluating the 
accuracy of these statements is a safeguard against false 
statements. 
Nevertheless, these statements are not automatically 
admissible. The trial court should consider the circum-
stances surrounding the making of the statement, such 
as improper influence or the use of suggestive or leading 
questions. This additional requirement, which the Court 
labeled "specific examination," applies "only to Evid. R. 
803(4) and only to declarants of tender years." /d. at 412. 
Identity of Assailant 
In addition, the Court considered whether statements 
identifying the perpetrator of the abuse are admissible 
under Rule 803(4). The Court explicitly adopted the 
reasoning of United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 438 
(8th Cir. 1985), a controversial federal decision. See 
Mosteller, "Child Sexual Abuse and Statements for the 
Purpose of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment," 67 N.C. L. 
Rev. 257 (1989). According to the Dever Court, "state-
ments made by a child during a medical examination 
identifying the perpetrator of sexual abuse, if made for 
[the) purpose of diagnosis and treatment, are admissible 
pursuant to Evid. R. 803(4)." ld. at 414. 
Confrontation 
The Court also ruled that admission of the statement 
did ~ot violate the defendant's right of confrontation, a 
holdmg that tracks the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in 
White v Illinois. Citing White, the Ohio Supreme Court 
held that "Evid. R. 803(4) is a firmly rooted hearsay 
exception in the circumstances of the case before us." /d. 
at 418. In addition, "[i]n such a case, the prosecution is 
not required to demonstrate the unavailability of the 
declarant." /d. 
EVIDENCE RULE 807 
In Boston, the Court invited the Rules Committee to 
examine the evidence issues raised in child abuse 
cases. The Committee responded by drafting Ohio 
Evidence Rule 807, which became effective in July, 1991. 
This rule recognizes a residual hearsay exception in 
child abuse cases. 
Statements admissible under Rule 807 must satisfy six 
conditions. First, the statement must have been made by 
~child who is under the age of 12 at the time of the trial 
Jr hearing. Second, the statement must describe a 
>exual act performed by, with, or on the child, or it must 
jescribe an act of violence directed at the child. Third, 
he statement must be trustworthy. Fourth, the child's 
n-court testimony must not be reasonably obtainable. 
=ifth, the statement must be corroborated by independent 
>roof. Sixth, the proponent must give pretrial notice of its 
ntention to introduce a statement under this rule ten 
lays before the trial or hearing. 
.aterCases 
In Dever, the Court noted the adoption of Rule 807, but 
llso quoted a portion of the Staff Note which stated that 
lule 807 recognized an exception "in addition to the 
~xceptions enumerated in Evid. R. 803 and 804." Then, 
1e Court commented that "the trial court in its discretion 
letermines which hearsay exception, if any, would most 
ppropriately support the admission of the child's state-
lents into evidence." /d. at 414. The dissent, however, 
elieved that Dever "seriously undermines Evid. R. 807" 
ecause it "will actually allow prosecutors to evade the 
arefully considered controls of Evid. R. 807." /d. at 420. 
In In re Coy, 07 Ohio St.3d 215, 616 N.E.2d 1105 (1993), 
1e Court struck down R.C. 2151.35(F), which created a 
~sidual hearsay exception for child abuse cases in juve-
ile court. The Court ruled that this provision was incon-
istent with the Ohio Rules of Evidence and thus invalid 
nder Section 5(8), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, 
hich empowers the Court to make procedural rules. 
he Court also noted that "Evid. R. 807 should be used 
'I trial courts in determining whether, in abuse cases, an 
Lit-of-court statement(s) made by a child who, at the time 
'trial (or hearing), is under the age of twelve years is 
jmissible at the trial or hearing." /d. (syllabus 2). 
See also State v. Black, 87 Ohio App.3d 724, 622 
. E.2d 1166 (1993) (physician's testimony that abrasions 
ere consistent with other causes in addition to sex 
Juse did not satisfy the independent proof requirement). 
STATE v. STORCH 
In State v. Storch, 66 Ohio St.3d 280, 612 N.E.2d 305 
~93), the Court once again addressed the hearsay 
5ues in child abuse cases. Storch was sentenced to two 
3 terms for rape. There was "virtually no proof ... 
aced before the jury indicating that Storch was guilty 
cept for the statements of A.M. [the victim] as related 
'third parties." /d. at 284. 
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Without overruling Dever, the Court significantly modi-
fied that holding. The third syllabus of Dever stated that 
the admission of a "statement pursuant to a firmly rooted 
hearsay exception does not violate a defendant's right of 
confrontation." However, in Storch, the Court noted that 
the applicability of the Ohio Constitution had not been 
before the Court in Dever. The Court then stated that the 
admission of a statement pursuant to a firmly rooted 
hearsay exception "may violate our state constitutional 
right of confrontation. The third paragraph of the syllabus 
in Dever should be construed to that effect." /d. at 291. 
Ohio Constitution 
The Court ruled that the Ohio Constitution provides 
greater confrontation protection than that provided by the 
federal constitution. The Court noted that the current 
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment by the U.S. 
Supreme Court "provides less protection for the accused 
than the protection provided by the Sixth Amendment as 
traditionally construed and by the express Words of 
Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution." /d. The 
Ohio Constitution, in the Court's view, generally requires 
a demonstration of the declarant's unavailability before 
hearsay statements are unavailable: 
We construe the right to confrontation contained in 
Section 10, Article I to require live testimony where 
reasonably possible. However, circumstances may 
exist where the evidence clearly indicates that a child 
may suffer significant emotional harm by being forced 
to testify in the actual presence of a person he or she is 
accusing of abuse. In such circumstances, the child 
may be considered unavailable for purposes of the 
Rules of Evidence and the out-of-court statements 
admitted without doing violence to Section 10 Article I, 
assuming Evid. R. 807 is otherwise satisfied. /d. at 293. 
Evidence Rule 807 
In Storch the Court also stated that "Evid. R. 807 
accords with the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation 
and of the confrontation rights in Section 10, Article I of 
the Ohio Constitution. We believe that Evid. R. 807 is the 
best way to protect both sets of confrontation rights, 
especially those specifically set forth in the Ohio 
Constitution." /d. at 289. 
The Court also noted that Rule 807 contemplates a 
pretrial hearing to determine the child declarant's availa-
bility. The Court added: ''A pretrial hearing would also 
permit an interlocutory appeal if the trial court's ruling on 
the child's availability and/or the admissibility of the 
child's extrajudicial statements so hinders the state's 
evidence that the state cannot proceed with its case." /d . 
at 293. 
STATEMENTS OF IDENTIFICATION 
State v. Boston 
As early as Boston, the Supreme Court cited Rule 
801(D)(1)(c) as a possible vehicle for admitting the out-of-
court statements of child abuse victims: "We suggest 
that a better way of admitting a child's statements iden-
tifying the perpetrator of child abuse can be found, under 
certain circumstances, in Evid. R. 801(D)(1)(c) rather than 
Evid. R. 803(4)." /d. at 124. 
This rule exempts statements from the hearsay rule if 
the "declarant testifies at trial or hearing and is subject to 
cross-examination concerning the statement, and the 
statement is ... (c) one of identification of a person soon 
after perceiving him, if the circumstances demonstrate 
the reliability of the prior identification." 
The Court in Boston added: "Accordingly, admitting a 
child's out-okourt identification of the perpetrator under 
Evid. R'. 801(D)(1)(c), withoutthe child's testimony at trial, 
requires the trial judge to conduct a voir dire examination 
of the child at which the child, under oath, is subject to 
cross-examination concerning her identification and re-
sponds willingly to questions about her identification." /d. 
State v. Storch 
In Storch the Supreme Court again commented on the 
possible use of Evid. R. 801(0)(1) in child abuse cases: 
We believe the live testimony of a child who has 
claimed abuse will in most cases enhance the reliabili-
ty of the fact-finding process. Videotaping or recording 
the interviews in which the out-of"court statements of 
the child are obtained would further enhance the 
integrity of the fact-finding proceeding. In many 
instances, Evid. R. 801(0)(1) or other Rules of 
Evidence would allow for the admission of the audio 
tapes or videotapes. If taping occurs and the tape is 
actually admitted into evidence, the trier of fact would 
have the benefit of the child's actual words and at least. 
some insight as to the child's demeanor. The trial court 
also would have the benefit of the actual questions or 
conversation which led up to the child's indication that 
an individual had abused the child. Certainly the ques-
tions asked can be a significant factor in determining 
the reliability of the response, as the Supreme Court of 
the United States acknowledged in Idaho v. Wright. In 
that case the Supreme Court noted that leading ques-
tions could affect a small child's responses. Therefore, 
such questions tended to make the responses less 
reliable. 66 Ohio St.3d at 292. 
Problems 
There are several problems with the use of Rule 801(0) 
(1)(c). First, the rule explicitly requires cross-examination 
of the declarant "concerning the statement." See United 
States v. Owen, 484 U.S. 554 (1988). Second, only an 
"identification" is admissible under this provision. 
Finally, the legislative history indicates that "stranger" 
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identifications were the focus of the rule. In other words, 
identifications at lineups, showups, and photographic 
displays would be admitted under this rule. 
The court in State v. Turvey, 84 Ohio App.3d 724, 618 
N.E.2d 214 (1992), discussed the effect Boston had in thl 
Ohio cases applying Rule 801(D)(1)(c): 
[A] difference exists between the thirteen pre-BostoJ 
and the ten post-Boston Ohio appellate court cases 
citing Evid. R. 801(D)(1)(c). The pre-Boston cases 
generally involved identifications made by strangers tc 
law enforcement personnel during the course of 
investigations conducted shortly after the crime. The 
stranger often, but not always, identified the defendan 
among others in a line-up or photo array. In the pre-
Boston cases, the identifications were necessary to 
prove no other person committed the crime. /d. at 739. 
By contrast, the majority ofthe post-Boston cases citin 
[the rule] involved close relatives - two fathers, thre 
stepfathers, and one uncle- of child victim-declarant~ 
The post-Boston identifications generally involved 
identifications made by children to mothers or doctors 
weeks or months after the crime. The child observed 
neither the defendant nor the defendant's photograph 
during the identification. In the post-Boston cases, the 
identifications addressed not the identity of the defen-
dant, but rather addressed the fact a crime was 
committed. /d. at 740. 
The court indicated that the rule had been misused in th 
post-Boston cases: the rule "perhaps should not have 
been cit~d or applied in the majority of the post-Boston 
Ohio appellate cases citing the rule." /d. at 741. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial of child sexual abuse cases presents signifi-
cant problems to both the prosecution and defense. The 
U.S. Supreme Court has weaken the Confrontation 
Clause in order to permit these prosecutions. In contras· 
the Ohio Supreme Court has demonstrated greater 
concern for recognizing the importance of confrontation 
values in these trials. 
For a further discussion of these issues, see Raeder, 
"Navigating between Scylla and Charybdis: Ohio's 
Efforts To Protect Children Without Eviscerating The 
Rights of Criminal Defendants- Evidentiary Considera 
tions And the Rebirth of Confrontation Clause Analysis i 
Child Sexual Abuse Cases," 25 U. Toledo L. Rev. 43 (1994 
